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Abstract
Three experiments explored the effects of priming the achievement concept on the 
expectation of performance outcomes and experiences of self-agency over outcomes in a task 
in which performance outcomes were dependent on chance. Experiment 1 and 2 showed that 
achievement priming produced expectations of higher (more successful) outcomes prior to 
working on the task, regardless of whether priming was subliminal (nonconscious) or 
supraliminal (conscious) and that this effect could not be attributed to subjective motivation to 
perform well. Experiment 3 revealed that subliminal achievement priming decreased 
participants’ experienced self-agency when outcome feedback was low, but increased self-
agency when it was high. Together, these results suggest that activating achievement concepts 
outside of awareness spontaneously triggers expectations of higher task outcomes, which 
increases or decreases self-agency depending on whether there is a match or mismatch with 
observed outcomes. Implications for the literature on achievement-priming effects on 
behavior are discussed.
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The Nonconscious Road to Perceptions of Performance:
Achievement Priming Augments Outcome Expectancies and Experienced Self-Agency
A theme that dominates research in personality and social psychology concerns the way
in which the concept of achievement directs people’s thoughts, behaviors, and outcomes 
(Elliot, 2005). One of the first research programs on this matter proposed that achievement 
represents an implicit or unconscious need, and utilized the Thematic Apperception Test 
(Murray, 1938) to show that individual differences in achievement motivation directly predict 
achievement-relevant outcomes (McClelland, 1987; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 
1953). Following the cognitive revolution in psychology, others have argued that human 
achievement is governed by an intentional process in which the agent consciously and 
reflectively guides action-performance. The emphasis on conscious intent as the immediate 
psychological cause of achievement has produced a variety of models that identify and predict 
the person’s expected values of achieving outcomes, and responses to success and failure 
feedback (Bandura, 1977; Locke & Latham, 1990; Ryan, 1970; Weiner, 1985). Recent 
research, however, has reopened the possibility that mental processes involved in achievement 
may originate in the unconscious (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). This line of research 
appreciates the pervasive role of the social environment (e.g., classroom, workplace) in 
triggering cognitive representations of achievement that affect performance outside people’s 
awareness.
The present research focuses not on performance itself, but on how people’s perceptions
of their performance are influenced by cognitively activating the achievement concept.
Specifically, we aim to demonstrate that achievement priming can lead to augmented 
expectancies about successful outcomes when working on a task. Although such changes in 
expectancies could potentially influence motivation and performance on a task, they may also 
independently alter the way in which people perceive their task outcomes once they are 
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established. That is, we argue that outcome expectancies directly affect people’s experiences 
of self-agency when their causal role in producing the outcome is unclear. Under such 
circumstances, augmented expectancies of success should increase experienced self-agency 
for relatively high outcomes, but decrease it for relatively low outcomes. Crucially, we aim to 
show that such achievement priming effects can even ensue from subliminal sources, as 
conscious expectations and experiences can be readily produced by unconscious primes (e.g., 
Aarts, 2007; Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Custers & Aarts, 2005). This paper reports 
three experiments designed to demonstrate such effects of achievement priming on outcome 
expectancies and experiences of self-agency.
Outcome Expectancies, Motivation and Performance
As outcomes expectancies are intimately related to motivation and performance, it is 
important to consider this relation in more detail in order to be able to distinguish between 
achievement priming effects on perceptions of performance and effects on motivation and 
performance itself. Outcome expectancies are related to motivation and performance in 
several ways. On the one hand, outcome expectancies are seen as causes of motivation and 
performance. In Expectancy x Value models of human decision-making and behavior, for 
instance, the expected outcome of the task and its value are proposed to be the main 
antecedents of motivation (Bandura, 1977; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Gollwitzer, 1990; Locke & Latham, 2002; Tolman, 1932). According to these models, if the 
expectancy of successful performance on a task increases while its value remains constant,
task motivation goes up, usually resulting in higher (i.e. more successful) outcomes. For 
example, one may be more motivated to work on a revision of a paper and produce a better 
manuscript if the perceived expectancy of getting the paper published is higher. It is important 
to note, however, that in these models expectancy and value are regarded as (subjective 
perceptions of) properties of the task. Outcome expectancies, then, are regarded as cognitive 
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representations produced by the characteristics of the task at hand that determine how strongly 
people are motivated to produce the outcomes in question.
On the other hand, expectancies of successful outcomes can also be the result, rather 
than the cause of motivation. That is, if people reflect on their motivation for a task, or on the 
perceived effort they invest in it, they may expect to produce better task outcomes on the 
same task when they are motivated, compared to not motivated. When, for example, one 
writes a letter for an important job application, one may expect to write a better letter than for
a less important application, not because the task is easier, but because one takes into account 
ones increased motivation for that task in ones expectancies of the outcome. Indeed, if one 
believes that ones additional effort as a consequence of an increased motivation will affect the 
task outcome for the better (see Bandura, 1977), one should expect more successful task 
outcomes. In this case, the change in expectancies is unrelated to changes in the expectancy 
property of the task, but is entirely based on beliefs about the relation between ones own
motivation and task outcomes. Hence, outcome expectancies are closely intertwined with 
motivation and cannot only be seen as the antecedent of motivation, but also as its
consequence.
Achievement Priming and Outcome Expectancies
Research on achievement suggests that apart from objective characteristics of the task 
itself, people’s performance is also affected by the setting in which a task takes place. When a 
given task is executed in a setting where people have achievement on their mind, such as a 
classroom or a sport venue, people try harder and usually do better than in settings where 
achievement is less salient (Elliot & McGregor, 2001). In this case, thoughts about 
achievement that are triggered by features of the environment increase task performance and 
produce more successful outcomes independently of task characteristics. 
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This suggest that mere activation of the achievement concept is enough to motivate 
behavior. Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001) presented 
evidence in line with this notion. In their research, they activated the construct of achievement 
in participants by having them work on a word search puzzle in which words related to 
achievement were hidden, or not. Subsequently, achievement was tested in a second puzzle 
task. It was found that participants for whom the achievement construct was unobtrusively 
activated performed better – obtaining higher task outcomes (see also Oikawa, 2004). 
Although these findings could be explained by assuming that achievement priming directly 
motivates behavior, it could also be the case that achievement priming induces expectancies 
of successful outcomes, which may – together with task value –affect performance.
Such expectations of successful outcomes may have become associated with the 
concept of achievement through repeated simultaneous activation of the cognitive 
representations of achievement and successful outcomes. It has been suggested that thoughts, 
or the cognitive activation of mental representations, can be linked to other mental 
representations (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) if they are often co-activated (Hebb, 1949). In 
the same way that pepper is associated with salt because these mental constructs are often 
activated together, the construct of achievement and expectancies of successful task outcomes 
may become linked together if they are often activated at the same time. If people often 
expect and observe successful outcomes (e.g., as a result of previous performance of skilled 
actions that have lead to the successful outcomes; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) when they have 
the concept of achievement on their mind, expectancies of successful outcomes may directly
come to mind if the concept of achievement is triggered by a cue in the environment.
The main purpose of the first two experiments is to demonstrate – using explicit 
measures of outcome expectancies – that these increases in outcome expectancies as a result 
of nonconscious achievement primes do occur. Moreover, they aim to demonstrate that these 
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increased outcomes expectations are triggered directly by the achievement primes and are not 
the result of people’s reflections on their motivation to perform well. However, in order to 
demonstrate that such expectancies are also formed spontaneously – in the absence of explicit 
instructions to reflect on them – one would have to measure these expectancies in a more 
indirect way. One way to do this is to look at experiences of self-agency that arise when 
people are confronted with task outcomes, as these experiences are known to be based on 
previously formed outcome expectancies.
Outcome Expectancies and Experienced Self-Agency
Expectations about successful outcomes are not only important because they may 
potentially affect performance. They are also important because they help us to establish the 
cause of effects that occur in the world. For many outcomes in the real world (e.g., acceptance 
of co-authored paper; a successful party), it is unclear whether they are the result of our own 
doing, or whether they are caused by someone or something else. Indeed, Hume (1888) 
already argued that causality can never be readily perceived, but always has to be inferred. It
has been proposed that experiences of self-agency arise from a match between the outcome of 
an action and knowledge about the outcome that is active prior to its occurrence (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999).
Indeed, recent research suggests that the establishment of self-agency operates through 
an authorship ascription process that is tuned to offering a current agent information about 
outcomes fluently and perfunctorily (Aarts et al., 2005; Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2009, 
Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). Building on this work, we here propose that experiences of self-
agency can be altered by the subliminal priming of achievement. Specifically, priming the 
concept of achievement before one performs a task (e.g., searching for words) and observes 
the actual outcomes (e.g., accurate detection of words) moderates the experience of self-
agency by the spontaneous activation of expectancies about the attainment of higher
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outcomes. A match between the two is expected to increase experienced self-agency, while a 
mismatch is thought to not affect or even decrease experienced agency. Importantly, because 
expectations of success can result from nonconscious activation of the concept of 
achievement, people’s experiences of self-agency can be modulated without awareness of the 
cause of this influence. Whereas the mechanism proposed here offers a key to understanding 
how nonconscious activation of the concept of achievement produces a conscious sense of 
agency over action performance, it also suggest that these experiences can arise independently 
of actual causation, resulting in illusory experiences of self-agency (Aarts et al., 2005; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
Although the influence of achievement priming on experiences of self-agency may be 
interesting in its own right, increases in those experiences would also provide more direct 
evidence for the spontaneous generation of higher outcome expectancies. Asking people to 
report their expectancies about performance for an upcoming task just after achievement 
priming may provide first evidence for augmented expectations about success. However, in 
that instance it remains ambiguous as to whether those expectations arise spontaneously or 
whether people only generate expectancies based on the activated achievement construct 
because the are asked to reflect on them. According to the literature on experiences of agency, 
outcome information would only affect experiences of agency if it is activated before people 
engage in action and produce the outcome (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Hence, if 
achievement priming would affect the experiences of self-agency of people after they have 
performed a task and perceived the outcome, this would demonstrate that expectations were 
already formed spontaneously before they engaged in the task. In Experiment 3 we therefore 
assessed people’s experiences of self-agency to obtain converging evidence for the idea 
outcome expectancies were formed spontaneously upon achievement priming.
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In line with the above reasoning, in the present paper we report three experiments that 
provide evidence for the idea that achievement priming leads to expectations of more 
successful outcomes. In Experiment 1, the basic idea that achievement priming increases 
outcome expectancies was tested, by explicitly asking people to report those expectancies. In 
order to further disentangle perceptions of performance from motivation and actual 
performance, motivation to perform well was measured. Experiment 2 compared the effect of 
unconscious achievement priming on outcome expectancies with that of a conscious goal to 
achieve and probed for relations between expectancies on the one hand and perceived effort 
and task value on the other hand. In Experiment 3, participants engaged in a performance task 
after nonconscious achievement priming and were confronted with outcomes that could either 
be their own or those of a fellow participant. We anticipated that participants who were 
nonconsciously primed with achievement would report higher expected outcomes 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and claim more authorship over relatively high outcomes and less 
authorship over relatively low outcomes (Experiment 3), compared to control participants.
Experiment 1
In this first experiment we aimed to gather initial evidence for the hypothesis that 
expectations of success can be increased as a result of nonconscious activation of the 
achievement concept. To test this, participants were subliminally primed with words related to 
the concept of achievement, and were then asked to perform a subliminal lexical decision task 
in which they had to indicate whether a briefly flashed string of letters was an existing word 
or not. The task was designed in such a way that random responses would produce a 50% 
chance of successful detection (the default performance rate), but allegedly allowed 
participants to exceed the level of chance. Pilot testing showed that participants did not 
consider this task as important, or diagnostic for achievement, ruling out the possibility that 
achievement was primed by the task itself (cf. Bargh et al., 2001). Before actually working on 
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the task, the subjective expectation of successful performance was measured by asking 
participants to indicate (in percentage form) how many of the trials they expected to answer 
correctly. It was predicted that achievement primed participants would expect a higher rate of 
success than nonprimed participants. Moreover, in order to investigate whether changes in 
expectancies could be the result of changes in participants’ motivation to perform well, two 
additional questions were included that tapped into this subjective motivation.
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty undergraduates participated in the experiment in exchange for € 3 or extra course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to one of the following two conditions: the 
nonconscious achievement prime, or no achievement prime-control condition.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that they would take part in 
research conducted by different investigators that involved performing several tasks on a 
computer. The computer program provided the instructions, and participants worked in 
separate cubicles. After some general instructions and practice with the computer program, 
participants started with the first task of the session. 
The first task was a letter-detection task in which participants had to press a key to 
indicate, as quickly as possible, whether a string of similar letters contained a capital or not. 
Half of the letter strings contained a capital. Before each letter string, a prime word was 
presented. In the nonconscious achievement prime condition, the prime was one of four 
different achievement-related words (achieve, strive, accomplish, win; see Bargh et al., 2001 
for a similar approach to achievement priming). In the no achievement prime-control 
condition, these four words were replaced by four positive words unrelated to the concept of 
achievement (beach, home, summer and smile). These positive words were chosen to control 
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for possible affective valence effects. Furthermore, previous work showed that these words do 
not modulate thoughts about performance (Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Custers & Aarts, 
2005). Each trial began with a random letter string as a fixation-point presented on the screen 
(100 Hz) for 500 ms. The prime was then presented for 30 ms, followed by a mask of random 
letters for 200 ms (see Aarts et al., 2008 for a subliminality check of this procedure). Finally, 
a string of similar letters was presented and remained on the screen until a response was made 
regarding capitalization. Each prime word was presented 10 times, and the inter-trial interval 
was 1.5 s.
Next, participants were given a second task that ostensibly involved determining 
whether letter strings represented existing words or not. They were told that a number of letter 
strings would be briefly presented on the screen, and that in half of the trials the letter strings 
would be an existing word, and in the other half they would simply be random strings of 
letters. Furthermore, it was stressed that previous research had indicated that the task is 
experienced as quite difficult, but that it should be possible to get more than 50% of the trials 
correct (i.e., have a higher success rate than would be expected based on chance). 
Before participants started to work on the task, they were asked to indicate (in 
percentage form) how many trials they expected to respond to correctly. This measure 
represents their outcome expectations for task performance. Moreover, participants were 
asked to report their motivation to perform well on the upcoming task (low [1] to high [9]), as 
well as the perceived importance of performing well on the upcoming task (not important [1] 
to very important [9]). The responses on the two questions proved to be highly correlated (r = 
.67, p < .01), and were therefore averaged into one index of motivation. After completing 
these ratings, participants commenced the task, which consisted of 60 trials. In half of the 
trials, existing words (e.g., key, machine) were presented; none of these words were 
achievement-relevant. Each trial began with a random letter string as a fixation point 
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presented on the screen for 500 ms. The target letter string was then presented for 30 ms, 
followed by a mask of random letters for 200 ms. Next, participants were asked to indicate 
whether or not an existing word had been presented on the screen. The question remained on 
the screen until a response was made. The trials were randomly presented, and the inter-trial 
interval was 1.5 s. 
At the end of the session, participants were debriefed using a funnel debriefing 
procedure based on that recommended by Bargh and Chartrand (2000). This debriefing 
indicated that participants did not realize the true nature of the experiment, and had not 
consciously processed the primes during the initial priming task. 
Results and Discussion
Effects on Outcome Expectations
Participants’ expected percentage of correct responses on the second task was 
subjected to a single factorial design (no achievement prime-control vs. nonconscious 
achievement-prime) between-participants ANOVA. Participants’ outcome expectations 
proved to be higher in the nonconscious achievement prime condition, M = 60.20, SD = 
10.56, than in the no achievement prime-control condition, M = 52.60, SD = 10.42, F(1, 48) = 
6.56, p = .01, 2 = .12.
Effects of Self-reported Motivation to Perform
The index of motivation to perform well did not differ between conditions, M = 4.89,
SD = 2.12, F < 1. Moreover, the motivation index did not correlate with the outcome 
expectancies (r = -.09, ns.).
Effects on Task Performance
To examine whether there was a difference between conditions in the success of 
detecting the subliminally presented words in the second task, the proportions of correct 
responses were subjected to an ANOVA. Given that the target letter strings were presented 
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below the threshold of conscious perception, null results were anticipated. As expected, this 
analysis showed that there was no difference between conditions on this task performance 
measure, F < 1. Furthermore, the average proportion of correctly categorized letter strings 
across conditions was .50 (SD = 0.06), and this proportion did not differ from chance, t(49) = 
0.18.
The current findings demonstrate that achievement priming activates expectations of 
higher task outcomes. This effect, however, does not seem to be accompanied by, and can 
hence not be attributed to, changes in task motivation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 served three purposes. First, we aimed to replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1 to examine the robustness of the achievement priming effect on outcome 
expectations. Second, this experiment was designed to more thoroughly investigate the 
relation between expectations of successful outcomes and motivation to perform well. 
Although it is known that motivation resulting from nonconscious priming of goals can affect 
explicit reports of motivation (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005), it could be the case that certain 
motivational processes were triggered in Experiment 1, but did not lead to a conscious 
experience of motivation (see e.g., Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 
2003). Whereas Experiment 1 demonstrated that people’s outcome expectancies could not be 
based on such a conscious experience of motivation to perform well, it could be that people 
based these expectancies on reflections on other motivation-related internal states. One 
important correlate of motivation to perform well is the experience of effort (Geen, 1995; 
Preston & Wegner, 2009; Wright & Brehm, 1989). If achievement priming motivates people
outside their awareness, it could be that they feel they have more effort to spend on their 
behavior. Thus, achievement priming may have caused participants to anticipate spending 
more effort on the task, which would yield more successful outcomes. Accordingly, the 
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achievement priming effects on outcome expectancies established in Experiment 1 may be 
associated with changes in such subjective assessments of effort.
Finally, in order to investigate the relation between motivation and outcome 
expectancies more closely, in this experiment we also included a conscious achievement 
prime condition, in which participants were explicitly encouraged to try to achieve as many 
correct responses as they could. Such explicit achievement instructions should motivate 
people to do well and also activate the achievement construct. If people would base their 
outcome expectancies on the effort they anticipate to spend on the task, assessments of effort 
should be correlated with outcome expectancies. This would not necessarily be the case if 
outcome expectancies are directly activated by priming of the achievement construct.
Although Experiment 1 demonstrated that nonconscious achievement priming did not 
cause people to consider performing well on the task as more important, it could be the case 
that achievement priming changes the subjective perceptions of the properties of the task
itself. That is, participants who are primed with achievement may perceive the task as more 
valuable or important, which could motivate them to spend more effort on the task. 
Accordingly, subjective task value was assessed as well.
Method
Participants and Design
Seventy-four undergraduates participated in the experiment in exchange for € 3 or 
extra course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of the following three conditions: 
nonconscious achievement prime, no achievement prime-control, or conscious achievement 
prime.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that they would take part in 
research conducted by different investigators that involved performing several tasks on a 
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computer. The computer program provided the instructions, and participants worked in 
separate cubicles. After some general instructions, participants started with the first task of the 
session. 
The procedure of the task was the same as that of Experiment 1, except for three
changes. First, after the assessment of participants’ outcome expectancies, the questions that 
probed for motivation to perform well were removed. Second, the additional conscious 
achievement prime condition unfolded in the same manner as the no achievement prime-
control condition, until the lexical decision task was reached. Then, before starting on this 
task, participants in this condition were encouraged to try to achieve as many correct 
responses as they could. Third, after the lexical decision task, perceived effort and perceived 
task value were assessed. Participants were asked to report the effort they had exerted on the 
task (none at all [1] to very much [9]). This measure represent their reported effort for the 
task. Furthermore, two questions were posed that focused on how valuable and important the 
task was to participants (not at all [1] to very much [9]). The two ratings were averaged (r = 
.48, p < .01) to form an index of perceived task value. Apart from these changes, the 
procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.
At the end of the session, participants were debriefed in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1. This debriefing indicated that participants did not realize the true nature of the 
experiment, and had not consciously processed the primes during the initial priming task. One 
participant reported not having understood the idea of 50% as a chance level of performance 
(this person reported a success expectation of 0%; all other participants reported a success 
expectation of 50% or above). This participant was omitted from the analyses.
Results and Discussion
Effects on Outcome Expectations
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The main dependent variable was participants’ expected percentage of correct 
responses on the second task. This variable was subjected to a single factor (nonconscious 
achievement-prime, no achievement prime-control, conscious achievement prime) between-
participants ANOVA. The analysis yielded a significant main effect, F(2, 70) = 4.81, p = .01, 
2 = .12. To test our specific hypothesis, several contrast analyses were conducted. These 
analyses revealed that participants’ outcome expectations were higher in the nonconscious 
achievement prime (M = 69.60, SD = 15.47) and conscious achievement prime (M = 67.92, 
SD = 9.20) conditions than they were in the no achievement prime-control condition (M = 
59.38, SD = 11.26), F(1, 71) = 8.34, p = .01, and, F(1, 71) = 5.56, p = .02, respectively. 
Outcome expectations in the nonconscious achievement prime and conscious achievement 
prime conditions did not differ from each other, F < 1. Figure 1 displays the success 
expectation ratings for each experimental condition.
Effects on Task Performance
To examine whether the three conditions produced differences in the success of 
detecting the subliminally presented words in the second task, the proportions of correct 
responses were subjected to the same ANOVA. As expected, this analysis showed that the 
three conditions did not differ from each other on this task performance measure, F < 1. 
Furthermore, the average proportion of correctly categorized letter strings across conditions 
was 0.51 (SD = 0.04), and this proportion did not differ from chance, t(72) = 1.63. 
Effects on Reported Effort
To test whether the experimental conditions influenced participants’ reported effort, 
this measure was subjected to the same ANOVA. A significant main effect was found, F(2, 
70) = 5.28, p = .01, 2 = .13. Further analyses revealed that reported effort was higher in the 
conscious achievement prime condition (M = 8.29, SD = 0.69) than in the nonconscious 
achievement prime (M = 7.76, SD = 0.78) and the no achievement prime-control (M = 7.58, 
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SD = 0.88) conditions, F(1, 71) = 5.17, p = .03, and, F(1, 71) = 9.94, p < .01, respectively. 
Reported effort in the nonconscious achievement prime and the no achievement prime 
conditions did not differ from each other, F < 1. Moreover, reported effort did not correlate 
with outcome expectancies (r = .13, ns.).
Effects on Perceived Task Value
To examine whether the experimental conditions changed participants’ perceptions of 
the value of the task, participants’ scores on the perceived task value index were subjected to 
the same ANOVA. This analysis showed that perceived task value was unaffected by the 
manipulations (M = 4.88, SD = 2.04), F < 1.
In sum, the results of this experiment suggest that the nonconscious priming of 
achievement activates higher expectations of success, in the same way as conscious priming 
does. Furthermore, the findings show that achievement priming had this effect without 
influencing participants’ value of the task and that augmented outcome expectancies were 
only accompanied by an increase in reported effort in the conscious, but not in the 
nonconscious, prime condition. Importantly, reported effort was found to be unrelated to 
outcome expectancies in all conditions. This suggests that increased expectancies in the 
conscious as well as the nonconscious prime condition were not caused by increases in the 
effort people anticipated to spend on the task. Moreover, increases in expectancies in the 
conscious as well as nonconscious achievement prime conditions were not accompanied by 
increases in the perceived value of the task, which is in line with other studies reporting that 
achievement priming effects on performance are not accompanied by such increases in task 
value (Bargh et al., 2001; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). 
Experiment 3
If outcome expectancies are indeed triggered spontaneously upon achievement, this 
could also change people’s experiences of authorship upon perceiving the outcome, as such 
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experiences of agency rely on a match between the actual outcome and mentally accessible 
outcome information. Such an effect would also provide stronger evidence for the 
spontaneous nature of the effect of achievement priming on outcome expectancies, as this 
would indicate that augmented expectancies of successful outcomes also arise when people 
are not explicitly asked to reflect on them. If the experience of agency indeed involves an 
authorship ascription process that relies on a comparison between spontaneously activated 
expectations of higher outcomes and actual outcomes (Aarts et al., 2005; Wegner & Sparrow, 
2004), then a match between the observed outcome and the pre-activated outcome should 
increase this sense of agency, whereas a mismatch should decrease it. In the context of our 
task, if the observed outcome is higher than chance, participants primed with the concept of 
achievement should experience more self-agency (that is, they should attribute these 
successful outcomes to themselves, rather than to another person), as these outcomes match 
with their personal outcome expectancies. Following the same reasoning, lower agency 
ratings are predicted for outcomes that are lower than chance, and therefore represent a 
mismatch to successful outcome expectancies.
To test this idea, we made use of an experimental set-up in which the exclusivity of 
the cause of the task outcome is ambiguous. Earlier research shows that priming effects on 
authorship processing are particularly acute when the source of the outcome is unclear (Aarts, 
2007; Aarts et al., 2005; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Building on this work, in this 
experiment we subliminally primed participants with achievement or not, and confronted 
them with three blocks of a lexical decision task, each followed by outcome feedback varying 
in the level of success (unbeknownst to participants, the feedback in the three blocks was 
either 30%, 50%, or 70%, in randomized order). However, participants were told that a fellow 
participant in a different cubicle was performing the same task and that the outcomes that they 
would receive after each block would either be their own or that of the other participant. This 
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procedure rendered the exclusivity of the cause of the performance ambiguous. Participants 
were then asked to indicate their experienced self-agency by reporting whether the observed 
task outcome was caused by themselves or by the other agent (i.e., the other participant). This 
comparison between ones own and another person’s outcomes made sure that personal
outcome expectancies were measured. 
Based on the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, and our ideas about the authorship 
ascription process involved in agency ascriptions, we expected that priming achievement 
would increase perceived self-agency when outcome feedback was relatively high, but would 
decrease it when outcome feedback was relatively low.
Method
Participants
Fifty undergraduates participated in the experiment in exchange for € 3 or extra course 
credit. They were randomly assigned to either a nonconscious achievement prime or no 
achievement prime-control condition.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that they would take part in 
research conducted by different investigators that involved performing several tasks on a 
computer. The computer program provided the instructions, and participants worked in 
separate cubicles. After some general instructions and practice with the computer program,
participants started with the first task of the session. 
The first task was the same letter-detection task used as the first task in Experiments 1
and 2. As in Experiment 1, the nonconscious achievement prime and no achievement prime-
control conditions were instantiated during this task. 
Next, participants were exposed to a second task ostensibly designed to examine 
experiences of personal causation, and how these experiences come and go. The task and 
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instructions were similar to those used in Experiment 1, with a few critical differences. The 
experimental task consisted of 3 blocks, each of which had 20 trials. Participants were told 
that the words that would be presented would be randomly drawn out of a set of 1000 existing 
words and 1000 random letter strings, and that the presented words within each block, in 
principle, could all be existing words or non-existing words. In actuality, half of the letter 
strings in each block were existing words (none of which were achievement-relevant), and the 
other half were not. Each trial used the same timing and presentation procedure used in 
Experiment 1, but after each block participants were provided with feedback that could either 
represent information about their own performance on that block or information about another 
participant’s performance who took the same task. The feedback was provided in terms of 
percentage of correct responses, and the following percentages were used: 30%, 50%, or 70%. 
Each participant received each level of feedback across the 3 randomly presented blocks. On 
receipt of the feedback, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt that 
the feedback related to their own performance. This perceived agency rating was assessed on 
a 1 (not at all me) to 10 (absolutely me) scale (see also Aarts et al., 2005, for this 
measurement).
Following the second task, participants were asked to indicate, on a 1 (not at all) to 9 
(absolutely) scale, whether their experiences of agency regarding the feedback were 
influenced by the initial letter-detection task. Participants’ reports on this measure did not 
differ across conditions, F’s < 1, suggesting that any influence of achievement priming on 
perceived agency was likely due to nonconscious sources. Finally, participants received a 
funnel debriefing as in Experiment 1 and 2. This debriefing indicated that participants did not 
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Effects on Experienced Agency
The main dependent variable was participants’ experienced self-agency. This variable 
was subjected to a 2 (Achievement priming: no vs. yes) x 3 (Outcome level: 30 vs. 50 vs. 70) 
mixed model ANOVA with achievement priming as a between-participants factor and 
feedback level as a within-participants factor. This analysis yielded a main effect of outcome 
level, F(2, 96) = 4.95, p = .01, 2 = .08. Participants’ experienced agency was lowest when 
receiving the 30% outcome, increased with the 50% outcome, and then slightly declined with 
the 70% outcome. The main effect of achievement priming was not significant, F < 1.27. 
Most importantly, the outcome level main effect was qualified by a significant Achievement 
Priming x Outcome Level interaction, F(2, 96) = 5.89, p < .01, 2 = .11. 
To test our specific hypothesis, the effect of the achievement prime on perceived 
agency was tested for each level of outcome. Participants primed with achievement reported
lower experiences of agency (M = 3.77, SD = 1.73) than nonprimed participants (M = 5.00, 
SD = 2.21) when they received the 30% outcome, F(1, 48) = 4.86, p = .03. However, within 
the 50% and 70% outcome conditions this difference was reversed: Achievement prime 
participants’ experiences of agency (M = 6.15, SD = 1.91) were somewhat stronger than those 
of nonprimed participants (M = 5.13, SD = 2.25) after the 50% outcome, F(1, 48) = 3.05, p = 
.09, and this effect was more pronounced, and significant after the 70% outcome (M = 5.65, 
SD = 1.70 and M = 4.42, SD = 1.91, respectively), F(1, 48) = 5.89, p = .02 (see Figure 2).
Effects on Task Performance
To examine whether the two achievement priming conditions produced differences in 
the success of detecting the subliminally presented words in the second task, the proportions 
of correct responses were examined with a t-test. This analysis showed that the two conditions 
did not differ from each other on the task performance measure, t < 1. Furthermore, the 
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average proportion of correctly categorized letter strings across conditions was 0.51 (SD = 
0.08), and this proportion did not differ from chance, t(49) < 1. 
The results of this experiment show that experiences of self-agency are affected by 
achievement priming. When outcome feedback was higher than chance, achievement priming 
increased experienced agency, but when outcome feedback was lower than chance, 
achievement priming decreased experienced agency. These differential effects show that the 
effects of achievement priming on self-agency are not a sole effect of priming, but depend on 
the task outcomes that are encountered. As experienced self-agency is known to arise from a 
match between pre-activated and observed outcomes, these findings suggest that high 
outcome expectancies were generated spontaneously upon achievement priming, which either 
increased or decreased experienced agency through a match or mismatch with the observed 
high or low outcomes (cf. Aarts et al., 2005). Because these effects rely on a match between 
pre-activated and observed outcomes, these finding demonstrate that outcome expectancies 
were spontaneously activated by the priming of the achievement construct. Furthermore, the 
achievement priming effects on agency experiences were independent of actual performance 
on the task, suggesting that participants’ experiences of self-agency were illusory. Finally, 
awareness checks indicated that these illusions of agency occurred in the absence of 
awareness of the cause (i.e., achievement priming) of the effect.
Note that because participants had to ascribe outcomes to themselves or to another 
participant, these results cannot be explained by expectancies about task difficulty or higher 
task expectations in general. If achievement priming would, for example, lower participants’ 
perceived task difficulty, this would make success more likely for themselves as well as for 
the other participant. Any differences in agency ratings would therefore have to be the result 
of personal success expectations, relative to expectations of success for the other participant. 
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It should be noted that in the 50% outcome condition, in which results were neither 
above nor below chance, a slight increase in agency was found. Although this effect was not 
significant, it is in line with earlier reported effects. Aarts (2007) found that when specific 
information about a match or mismatch was absent, the priming of success increased 
experienced agency. As the outcome at chance level would neither represent a successful nor 
an unsuccessful outcome, the evidence for a match or mismatch could be regarded as 
inconclusive, leading to the increase in experienced agency that was reported previously in 
the literature. 
General Discussion
Three experiments explored the effects of nonconscious priming of the achievement 
concept on people’s expectations of successful outcomes and agency ascriptions. The results 
of Experiments 1 and 2 showed that achievement priming led participants to expect higher 
performance outcomes on a subsequent task in which they had no actual control and that
produced performance outcomes at chance-level. These effects emerged regardless of the 
nature of the priming effect: subliminal as well as supraliminal (conscious) exposure to 
achievement modulated expectations of success. Importantly, the increase in expectations in 
the nonconscious achievement prime condition could not be attributed to variations in 
motivation to perform, perceived task value, or effort. The findings of Experiment 3 revealed 
that subliminal achievement priming increased the sense of self-agency over task outcomes 
when outcomes were high, but decreased experienced agency when outcomes were low. This 
supports the idea that the increased expectancy ratings observed in Experiments 1 and 2 
reflect personal outcome expectancies, that are triggered by priming of the achievement
construct, and that these expectancies arise in a spontaneous manner in the task at hand and do 
not have to be triggered by explicit instructions per se. The current effects of achievement 
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priming on expectancies may therefore be explained by, or considered to ensue from, mere 
associations between achievement and successful outcomes that have developed over time. 
From Abstract to Specific Outcome Expectancies 
As the concept of achievement may be associated with higher expectations of 
successful outcomes in general, these expectations – once activated – have to be translated 
into more concrete outcome expectancies to match the informational context pertaining to the 
task at hand (i.e. 50 % chance). One plausible way in which such higher expectations of 
success could be translated into more specific outcome expectancies (e.g., higher than chance 
level outcomes), could be through a construal or interpretation process (e.g., Kay & Ross, 
2003). It may be the case that after achievement priming the activation of expectations about 
higher outcomes led participants to perceive the current experimental tasks as a situation in 
which they would perform better than chance. In fact, this is exactly what expectancies are all 
about. 
It seems unlikely, however, that expectancies are simply the result of construing the 
task as an achievement task. As Kay and Ross (2003) have suggested, achievement primes 
could lead people to perceive an ambiguous task more as an achievement task, which could 
lead people to decide to work harder on the task, because the task is seen as more meaningful 
or valuable. The current task, however, was specifically designed to prevent such effects
From occurring. That is, the task (detecting subliminally flashed words) was pilot tested not to 
be diagnostic for achievement. Moreover, the task was explained in much detail to 
participants, thereby leaving as little room for interpretation as possible. It may therefore not 
come as a surprise that in the current experiments no effects of nonconscious achievement 
priming were found on motivation to perform well, reported effort, or task value. Hence, 
achievement priming did not lead participants to see the task as more valuable or important. 
Together, this suggest that expectancies about performance are not the result of an 
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interpretational process interacting with the task setting and instructions. Hence, construals
may play a role in translating higher expectations into more specific outcome information 
about the task at hand, but they do not seem to drive the effects of achievement priming on 
outcome expectancies and self-agency.
Individual Differences
The current findings suggest that achievement priming creates expectancies of 
successful outcomes through an associative link between the achievement construct and such 
expectancies. However, the extent to which achievement priming causes these effects is likely 
to be moderated by the strength of this association. Although exploring these individual 
differences was beyond the scope of the current research, some predictions are worth noting. 
For example, for people who have frequently failed to live up to their intended outcomes in 
achievement settings, achievement may be associated with expectancies of lower, rather than 
higher outcomes. Moreover, there may be other individual differences that influence the 
relation between achievement and outcome expectancies. It is, for instance, known that for 
dysphoric people such lower outcome expectancies have become associated with the self. 
Hence, activating the self concept leads them to activate lower outcome expectancies (Aarts, 
Wegner, & Dijksterhuis, 2006). As experiences of failure to live up to outcomes are most 
likely to occur in settings in which achievement is at stake, achievement priming may have 
similar effects as self priming. As such, individual differences in dysphoria may modulate the 
associations between achievement and expected outcomes, which may yield different effects 
of achievement priming on outcome expectancies. 
This suggests that associations between the achievement concept and outcome 
expectancies may not always be determined by the objective, but rather by the perceived 
contingency between the two. Diener and Dweck (1978) have noted that people differ in the 
extent to which they attribute failure or success to the self. Depending on this individual 
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difference, people may be more or less likely to regard successful outcomes in achievement 
settings as personal outcomes, which may potentially affect the extent to which personal 
outcome expectancies become associated to, and are activated by, achievement priming. 
Based on the findings of the current research, however, we would predict that regardless of 
how associations between achievement and outcome expectancies are formed, the resulting 
cognitive association determines which outcome expectancies are activated by the 
achievement concept.
Achievement Priming Effects on Behavior
By demonstrating effects of achievement priming on outcome expectancies, the 
current findings may provide a new perspective on achievement priming effects on 
performance. In the present experiments, the task was designed in a way that allowed us to 
eliminate performance effects, in order to study the effects of outcome expectancies 
independently of actual performance. The results of our experiments indeed showed that 
outcome expectancies and experiences of agency did not correspond with actual performance 
(which was always at chance level), nor with reported effort investment.
We do, however, not exclude the possibility that outcome expectations may in turn 
affect performance outcomes in tasks other than the one that was used in the current 
experiments. In tasks in which expectancies may lead people to become more motivated to 
achieve or perform well – or expend more effort in the task – expectancies could alter 
people’s behavior and consequently influence their task performance. Hence, the current 
findings suggest that achievement priming may not only alter performance because it directly 
motivates people to achieve (cf. Bargh et al., 2001), but also through changes in outcome 
expectations that together with value could influence performance through conscious 
reflections. It remains an empirical issue, though, whether such expectations may be 
transformed into a higher level of motivation outside the person’s conscious awareness, and 
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hence whether achievement motivation as a function of expected values can arise through 
nonconscious processes as well (see for evidence in favor of this notion Bijleveld, Custers, & 
Aarts, in press).
However, it could also be the case that expectancies affect behavior through other 
processes than motivation as a function of expected value. It could, for example, be the case 
that higher or lower outcome expectancies cause people to behavior more or less confidently, 
or more or less cautious. One specific instance of such a way in which expectancies triggered 
by the achievement concept may affect performance is stereotype threat. Stereotype threat 
refers to the apprehensions people feel when performing in a domain in which their group is 
stereotyped to lack ability (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Steele and Aronson (1995) 
demonstrated that participants belonging to stereotyped groups perform worse on a test when 
this test is presented as diagnostic in the relevant domain. One could argue that in this case, 
the framing of the task triggers the concept of achievement, which – in combination with the 
stereotype – creates expectancies of lower task outcomes. Importantly, stereotype threat 
effects are not necessarily explained in terms of a lower task motivation due to a decreased 
expected value of the task. In a recent review, Schmader, Johns, and Forbes (2008) conclude 
that physiological stress responses, a tendency to actively monitor performance, and efforts to 
suppress negative thoughts may all consume executive resources that cause deteriorated 
performance. Hence, stereotype threat may be an instance in which expectancies triggered by 
the achievement concept in a specific setting may trigger outcome expectancies that influence 
performance not necessarily through task motivation, but through other processes that 
impinge on performance. 
This is not to say that achievement priming never has direct affect on motivation. An 
important moderator of achievement priming effects on motivation may be the subjective 
value or desirability of the achievement concept (McClelland, 1953; cf. Custers & Aarts, 
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2005). Shah (2003), for instance, demonstrated that priming people with the name of another 
person who would want them to perform well (achieve) on a verbal fluency task, increased 
persistence on this task compared to a control group to the extent to which they were close to 
this person. This increase in persistence was accompanied by an increase in task goal 
commitment, which suggests that the extent to which achievement on that specific task was 
desirable for the participant in the context of the primed other determined the extent to which 
achievement priming increased performance. Hence, individual differences in the value of 
achievement may moderate achievement priming effects on motivational behavior (cf. Custers 
& Aarts, 2007), and even do so by altering the value of the task at hand.
Achievement Priming and Agency
In addition to providing evidence for the spontaneous generation of outcome 
expectancies, the effects of achievement priming on experienced self-agency are interesting in 
their own right. When achievement-related constructs are rendered accessible before engaging 
in a task, people are more likely to claim authorship for high outcomes and less likely to claim 
authorship for low outcomes. These differential effects of achievement priming suggest that 
these experiences of agency are produced by matches or mismatches between expectancies 
and perceived outcomes. Although earlier studies have shown that priming the concept of 
success causes people to experience more self-agency over outcomes that are in themselves
unrelated to success (e.g., stopping a rotating square on a certain position; Aarts, 2007) the 
current findings show that expectations of successful outcomes can also interact with outcome 
information when this information is meaningful in terms of success, causing people to 
experience more self-agency after matching than after mismatching outcomes.
There seem, however, to be limits to these effects on experienced self-agency. Our 
findings suggest that people do not claim authorship for outcomes only on the basis of these 
expectations. Although achievement priming significantly increased experienced self-agency 
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in the 70% outcome condition, participants in this condition experienced less self-agency than 
in the 50% outcome condition, even though 70% is a better score. Apparently, participants 
realized that a high degree of success on a chance task is fairly unlikely. Hence, their 
experience of self-agency was constrained by their understanding of reality (cf. research on 
constraints in motivated reasoning, Kunda, 1999). Nevertheless, even within in the 70% 
condition in which experienced self-agency was lower than in the 50% condition, an 
achievement priming effect was still present. This demonstrates that even though we may try 
to rely on reality and be objective, our expectations may still alter our self-causation 
experiences, as the authorship ascription process itself may be influenced by our expectations 
outside of awareness (Aarts, 2007; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004).
To conclude, the current research reveals novel effects of achievement priming. In 
addition to the effects reported in the literature on motivation and performance, the current 
studies demonstrate that achievement priming changes people’s perceptions of performance.
These effects are explained in terms of a cognitive association between the concept of 
achievement and augmented experiences of successful outcomes. These findings have 
important consequences for the interpretation of achievement priming effects on performance, 
in that they open up the possibility that some of these effects are caused by changes in 
outcome expectations. As demonstrating such a chain of effects was not the purpose of the 
current studies, this possible route for achievement priming effects on performance remains 
open for future research. Moreover, the effects on experienced agency demonstrate that 
achievement priming may determine to what extent people regard outcomes as their own, 
which can have important consequences for people’s assessments of control and responsibility 
in achievement settings. Hence, activating the concept of achievement may have important 
psychological consequences, not only because it affects the actual outcomes people produce, 
but also because it affects the way in which these outcomes are perceived.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Outcome Expectations as a Function of Achievement Prime Condition (Experiment 
2).
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